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I. INTRODUCTION
[I]llegal aliens are those who . . . are likely to maintain no
permanent address in this country, elude detection through an assumed
identity, and—already living outside the law—resort to illegal activities
to maintain a livelihood . . . one seeking to arrange an assassination
would be especially eager to hire someone who had little commitment to
this nation’s political institutions and who could disappear afterwards
without a trace.2
In June 2011, evidently influenced by a fear of stealthy alien
assassins, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that undocumented
residents lack Second Amendment rights under the Constitution. 3 In
upholding the 1986 amendments to the federal Omnibus Crime Control
Act, which denied undocumented residents the right to bear arms,4 the
Fifth Circuit’s ruling broke new ground in the circuit courts based on
how it came to that decision. Judge Garwood’s majority opinion upheld
the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), declaring that
undocumented residents are not “people” under the Second Amendment.5
This Comment proposes that the decision in United States v. PortilloMunoz misinterpreted the recent guidance of the United States Supreme
Court regarding gun rights, and that this misreading creates uncertainty
regarding the constitutional rights of undocumented persons in the
United States.
This Comment emphasizes the need for a resolution that fairly
balances constitutional rights with necessary limitations. Part II
introduces the reader to Portillo-Munoz, the first decision made by the
federal appellate courts on the issue of whether the Second Amendment
applies to undocumented immigrants. The section then discusses the
2 United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 2011), as revised
(June 29, 2011) (citing United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 128–29 (2d Cir. 1984)).
3 Id. at 442.
4 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (as amended 1986); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S.
563 (1977); see also Scott Jacobs, Toward A More Reasonable Approach to Gun
Control: Canada As A Model, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 315, 328– 29 (1995)
(“The 1986 amendments expanded the classes of persons prohibited from selling,
shipping, or receiving firearms to include illegal aliens, veterans who had received a
dishonorable discharge, and persons who had renounced their U.S. citizenship.”).
5 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442.

2012]

Seton Hall Circuit Review

161

second federal appellate court analysis of this same issue6 by the Tenth
Circuit in United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 7 which firmly grounds its
reasoning in Supreme Court precedent.8 Part III analyzes several errors
of Portillo-Munoz court’s interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, and
considers other possible formulations of constitutional rights. This
Comment concludes that the Tenth Circuit’s analysis in Huitron-Guizar
is more appropriate than the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Portillo-Munoz.
II. BACKGROUND
A. United States v. Portillo-Munoz
On July 10, 2010, Armando Portillo-Munoz, a ranch hand, was
“spinning around” on his motorcycle in Dimmit, Texas, when he was
approached by the police. 9 The police officers found a .22 caliber
handgun in his vehicle, and a dollar bill with a white powdery substance
inside the folds.10 Portillo-Munoz admitted to being a citizen of Mexico
who was illegally present in the United States.11 He was arrested and
charged with unlawfully carrying a weapon and possession of a
controlled substance.12 Prior to this arrest, Portillo-Munoz had obtained
the gun to protect the chickens on the ranch from coyotes.13 He was
sentenced to ten months imprisonment, followed by three years of
supervised release.14
On appeal, Portillo-Munoz argued that his conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), a federal gun law, violated his right to bear arms
under the Second Amendment, 15 which provides: “A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”16 The provision
under which he was convicted states that it is “unlawful for any person . .
. who, being an alien . . . illegally or unlawfully in the United States . . .
to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or

6 The Eight Circuit also affirmed a conviction of an undocumented immigrant under
the federal law in United States v. Flores, 663 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2011); however, it
merely affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit.
7 678 F.3d 1164, 1165 (10th Cir. 2012).
8 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990).
9 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 438.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 439.
12 Id.
13 United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 2011).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”17 Portillo-Munoz argued
that, despite his illegal status, he should be included in the definition of
“the people” who are entitled by the Second Amendment to keep and
bear arms.18 He argued that, in the past, the Supreme Court interpreted
the concept of “people” to include more than just the nation’s citizenry,19
and that the Fifth Circuit itself had previously employed a broader test to
determine which “people” were due the Fourth Amendment’s similarlyworded protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.20
As a matter of first impression in the federal circuits, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of Section
922(g)(5), upholding the federal ban on gun possession by
undocumented immigrants in the United States.21 The court based its
holding primarily on the recent Supreme Court case District of Columbia
v. Heller, which held that the Second Amendment conferred an
individual right to bear arms independent from a person’s involvement in
a militia. 22 Justice Scalia, writing for the Heller majority, stated that
“whatever else [the Second Amendment] leaves to future evaluation, it
surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”23 Yet
while the Heller decision effectively overruled certain gun restrictions in
the District of Columbia, the Court took care to confine the scope of its
decision to individuals denied firearms prior to its holding.24 The Court
stated that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”25 In a
footnote to this statement, the Court added that those served “only as
examples” and that the “list does not purport to be exhaustive.”26
17

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).
Brief for Petitioner at 10, United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 439 (5th
Cir. 2011) (No. 11-10086).
19 Id. at 12.
20 Id
21 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442.
22 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
23 Id. at 635.
24 See id. (“In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on handgun possession in the
home violates the Second Amendment. . . . Assuming that Heller is not disqualified from
the exercise of Second Amendment rights, the District must permit him to register his
handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home.”).
25 Id. at 626–27.
26 Id. at 627 n. 26.
18
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The Fifth Circuit held that, based on the Heller decision, any
Second Amendment rights available to U.S. citizens should remain
foreclosed to undocumented residents like Portillo-Munoz.27 The court
specifically stated that the “language in Heller invalidates Portillo’s
attempt to extend the protections of the Second Amendment to
undocumented residents,” as “[u]ndocumented residents are not ‘lawabiding, responsible citizens’ or ‘members of the political
community.’” 28 The Fifth Circuit held that the Heller decision, in
addition to affirming the Second Amendment as an individual right, also
reinterpreted the meaning of the phrase “the people,” at least for
purposes of the Second Amendment.29 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged
that the Supreme Court’s prior interpretation of the word “people,” in the
context of the Fourth Amendment, 30 “indicated that the same analysis
would extend to the text of the Second Amendment.”31 Nevertheless, the
court declined to analogize the identical wording of the two amendments,
instead declaring, “[t]he Second Amendment grants an affirmative right
to keep and bear arms, while the Fourth Amendment is at its core a
protective right against abuses by the government.” 32 Based on this
perceived distinction between the two amendments, as well as its citizenfocused interpretation of Heller, the Fifth Circuit refused to apply the
broader definition of “the people” embraced by Supreme Court
precedent.33
B. United States v. Huitron-Guizar
Nearly one year later, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reached
the same conclusion as the Fifth Circuit regarding the Second
Amendment, but did so using a less categorical approach. In March
2011, pursuant to a warrant, law enforcement officials searched the home
of Emmanuel Huitron-Guizar, a Mexican citizen who had lived in the
United States since age three. The search turned up three firearms. 34
The police also discovered that Huitron-Guizar was undocumented, and
he was charged with violating § 922(g)(5).35
27

See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440.
Id. at 440 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 644).
29 Id. at 440.
30 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .”) with U.S. CONST. amend.
II (“ . . . the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”).
31 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440.
32 Id. at 441.
33 See supra note 27.
34 Id.
35 Id.
28
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The Tenth Circuit upheld his conviction, while avoiding a
determination of whether the Second Amendment excludes HuitronGuizar as an undocumented resident.36 The court specifically refuted the
Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Heller, noting that “aliens were not part
of [Heller’s] calculus.” 37 The court also stated that an “even greater
reason not to read an unwritten holding into Heller is that the question
seems large and complicated.” 38 Noting that the history of gun
ownership and citizenship requirements of the colonial era were not
discussed by either party, the court declined to answer a “question of
such far-reaching dimensions without a full record and adversarial
argument.” 39 Instead, the court upheld § 922(g)(5) by employing an
intermediate scrutiny analysis, finding that the firearm ban was
“substantially related to an important” government ends of crime control
and public safety.40
C. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is
not implicated by a search that targets a noncitizen that occurs outside
In this case, the Drug Enforcement
the nation’s borders. 41
Administration arrested a Mexican citizen who was believed to be a
leader of a large and violent narcotrafficking operation. 42 VerdugoUrquidez was arrested in Mexico by local police officers and transported
to California, where United States Marshal Service arrested him and held
him for trial.43 American and Mexican police officers searched his house
in Mexico without a warrant, and Verdugo-Urquidez sought to have the
incriminating documents suppressed from his trial in the United States.44
The Supreme Court ruled that Verdugo-Urquidez did not qualify as
one of “the people” protected by the “Fourth Amendment [or] the First
and Second Amendments.”45 The plurality of the Court, however, did
not make that determination based solely on the defendant’s lack of
United States citizenship, and instead used a “sufficient connections”
test, finding that Verdugo-Urquidez could not be considered one of “the
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 1170.
Id. at 1168.
Id. at 1169.
Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d at 1169.
Id.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990).
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id. at 262–63.
Id. at 265.

2012]

Seton Hall Circuit Review

165

people” because he was not a member of the “class of persons who are
part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
connection with this country to be considered part of that community.”46
Justice Kennedy concurred with the majority, but expressed
dissatisfaction that the majority focused on the defendant’s status, and
not the government’s conduct.47 The majority, however, did not seem
eager to apply the “sufficient connections” test to noncitizens who reside
in the country illegally, and in fact, seemed to back away from prior case
law, which assumed that illegally-residing aliens have Fourth
Amendment rights.48 Having just propounded a test based on sufficient
connections, the Court refused to carve out a special exception for
individuals residing in the United States illegally, who in many cases
may have been able to show sufficient connections to the country. In the
end, the Court neither affirmatively granted Fourth Amendment
protection to undocumented residents, nor categorically barred them
from protection under the constitutional provision.49
D. Post-Verdugo-Urquidez
Twenty-one years later, the Fifth Circuit, in Portillo-Munoz,
interpreted the Heller decision as clarifying the Verdugo-Urquidez
standard of “sufficient connection” in regard to undocumented
residents. 50 Prior to Heller, a court may have inquired into the
connections of an alien – resident or otherwise – to determine if he was
sufficiently connected to the United States to be part of the national
community.51 The Portillo-Munoz court, however, interpreted Heller as
46

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
See id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Given the history of our Nation’s
concern over warrantless and unreasonable searches, explicit recognition of ‘the right of
the people’ to Fourth Amendment protection may be interpreted to underscore the
importance of the right, rather than to restrict the category of persons who may assert
it.”).
48 Id. at 272 (“Our statements in Lopez-Mendoza are therefore not dispositive of how
the Court would rule on a Fourth Amendment claim by illegal aliens in the United States
if such a claim were squarely before us.”).
49 Id. at 272–73 (“Even assuming such aliens would be entitled to Fourth
Amendment protections, their situation is different from respondent’s. The illegal aliens
in Lopez-Mendoza were in the United States voluntarily and presumably had accepted
some societal obligations; but respondent had no voluntary connection with this country
that might place him among ‘the people’ of the United States.”)
50 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440.
51 See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 2010 WL 4852390 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 10, 2010); Veiga
v. World Meteorological Org., 568 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) aff’d sub nom.
Veiga v. World Meteorological Organization, 368 F. App’x 189 (2d Cir. 2010); United
States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1265 (D. Utah 2003) aff’d, 386 F.3d
953 (10th Cir. 2004).
47
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closing the door to any claims brought by undocumented United States
residents.52
Though Heller quotes the Verdugo-Urquidez standard of the “class
of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part
of that community,” 53 Justice Scalia paraphrased the quote when he
restated that “the people,” as a term of art, “unambiguously refers to all
members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.”54 Based
on this pronouncement, the Portillo-Munoz court stated that the sufficient
connections test of the Fourth Amendment would not be applicable to an
alien illegally present in the United States. 55 This limitation on the
sufficient connections test, coupled with the Supreme Court’s reference
in Heller to citizens,56 foreclosed any possibility that Mr. Portillo-Munoz
is a member of “the people” under either the Second or Fourth
Amendment.
III. ANALYSIS
Although the Fifth Circuit based its holding that undocumented
residents lack Second Amendment rights on the Heller decision, a close
reading of Heller does not support that proposition. Banning individuals
residing in the United States illegally from owning firearms may seem
reasonable, but any such prohibition should result from a careful
weighing of the relevant governmental and societal interests at stake. It
cannot simply be the result of a blanket policy of excluding all rights and
privileges to those who lack documentation.
Certainly, mere
constitutional semantics should not control the outcome when several
fundamental rights are at stake. The Heller decision, which expanded
the Second Amendment as an individual right to self-defense, cannot
also be plausibly used to curtail that same right for undocumented
residents.

52

Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 580 (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265).
54 Id. at 580.
55 See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440 (“ . . . neither this court nor the Supreme
Court has held that the Fourth Amendment extends to a native and citizen of another
nation who entered and remained in the United States illegally.”).
56 See id. at 440 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635) (“The Court held the Second
Amendment ‘surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.’”).
53
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A. The Text of Heller Does Not Support a Narrower Reading of
“The People”
To support its holding, the Fifth Circuit pointed to two examples in
the Heller decision in which the language employed would exclude
undocumented residents.57 Specifically, the court pointed to Heller’s use
of the phrases “law-abiding, responsible citizens”58 and “members of the
political community”59 to establish the proposition that a person cannot
be a member of “the people” unless he is also a citizen. The Fifth Circuit
reinforced this idea by concluding that “[a]liens who enter or remain in
this country illegally and without authorization are not Americans as that
word is commonly understood.”60
The Portillo-Munoz majority offers no further guidelines on who is
“commonly understood” to be an American. Nor does the court offer
any textual support for this declaration, leaving the skeptical reader with
a suspicion that the common understanding is common only to three
circuit judges. One could presume that by “American,” the judges are
referring to those who have United States citizenship. The phrases from
Heller that the Fifth Circuit majority cites, however, do not state that the
person who qualifies as a member of “the people” must simply be a
citizen.
Instead, the citizen must also be “law-abiding” and
“responsible,” and should also be a “member of the political
community[.]” Although “law-abiding” certainly corresponds to the
current law that prohibits felons from gun ownership,61 it is difficult to
translate the other two characteristics into workable tests for who should
be allowed to own a gun. “Responsible” is a highly subjective
characteristic that is not necessarily correlated with gun ownership at
all. 62 Similarly, no one contends that being a member of a political
community (e.g., having voting rights) should be one of the determinants

57

Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440.
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“The Court held the Second Amendment ‘surely
elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms
in defense of hearth and home.”).
59 See id. at 580 (“What is more, in all six other provisions of the Constitution that
mention ‘the people,’ the term unambiguously refers to all members of the political
community, not an unspecified subset.”).
60 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440.
61 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).
62 Garen J. Wintemute. Association between firearm ownership, firearm-related risk
and risk reduction behaviours and alcohol-related risk behaviours. INJURY PREVENTIONBRITISH
MEDICAL
JOURNALS
(Jun.
13,
2011).
http://injuryprevention.bmj.com/content/early/2011/06/13/ip.2010.031443.abstract.
(finding that gun owners are twice as likely to participate in binge drinking, chronic
heavy drinking, and drinking and driving than are non-gun owners).
58
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for gun access. So, then, why are courts so quick to conflate citizenship
with Second Amendment rights?
Another concern with basing a new constitutional rule on only a
few words of dicta is that words are often ambiguous. The Oxford
English Dictionary, for example, defines “citizen” in its first, three-part
definition as “an inhabitant of a city or (often) of a town; [especially] one
possessing civic rights and privileges, a burgess or freeman of a city[,]”
as “a townsman, as opposed to a countryman[;]” and finally, a “civilian
as distinguished from a soldier; in earlier times also distinguished from a
member of the landed nobility or gentry.” 63 Only then does the
dictionary, in its second definition, discuss what the Portillo-Munoz
majority views as the correct interpretation: “A member of a state, an
enfranchised inhabitant of a country, as opposed to an alien . . . .”64 The
distinction between “citizen” meaning “person who possesses United
States citizenship” and “citizen” meaning “everyday person” should not
come as a surprise to anyone accustomed to reading bombastic Supreme
Court decisions,65 especially those written by Justice Scalia.66 The word
“citizen” may resonate with more grandiosity than its simpler, yet more
accurate, counterpart “person.” That, however, does not necessarily
mean that the Court was intending to equate the two concepts.
A survey of numerous other majority opinions authored by Justice
Scalia reveals a pattern of similar rhetoric, in which “citizen” does not
denote anything other than a simple inhabitant of the United States. In
Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 67 for example, Justice Scalia
stated, “[t]his accords, we think, with our ‘takings’ jurisprudence, which
has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citizens
regarding the content of, and the State’s power over, the ‘bundle of
rights’ that they acquire when they obtain title to property.”68 One who
performs even a cursory survey of Justice Scalia’s majority opinions is
sure to find that this overbroad use of “citizen” is not uncommon. 69
63

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 249 (2d ed. 1989).
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 250 (2d ed. 1989).
65 See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (“Patently offensive,
indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public,
but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s right to be left alone plainly
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.”) (emphasis added).
66 See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Scalia Objects. N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2011, 8:40
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/09/justice-scalia-objects/.
67 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
68 Id. at 1027 (emphasis added).
69 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2755 (2011) (“The
Republic would require virtuous citizens, which necessitated proper training from
childhood.”) (emphasis added); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086 (2011) (“For
example, a law-abiding citizen might observe a crime during the days or weeks before a
64
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Patriotically spirited as the word “citizen” may be, it should not be read
literally as a constitutional test.
To find support for the idea that the word “citizen” cannot always
be taken at face value, one merely needs to examine other uses of the
word “citizen” in the Heller decision to see if the word is interchangeable
with the phrase “person with United States citizenship.” For example,
the opinion states: “The District [of Columbia] law, by contrast, far from
imposing a minor fine, threatens citizens with a year in prison (five years
for a second violation) for even obtaining a gun in the first place.”70 If
one uses the strict reading of “citizen” that the Fifth Circuit requires, then
the statement becomes: “The District law . . . threatens persons with
United States citizenship with a year in prison . . . .” Since the District of
Columbia statute does not in fact threaten only bona fide citizens with
such a punishment (the actual language uses the word “person”),71 one
cannot escape the impression that Justice Scalia used the word “citizen”
for the purpose of rhetorical flourish at least once in Heller. An example
scheduled flight abroad.”) (emphasis added); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 170
(2008) (“Moreover, even though several state constitutions also prohibited unreasonable
searches and seizures, citizens who claimed officers had violated state restrictions on
arrest did not claim that the violations also ran afoul of the state constitutions.”)
(emphasis added); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (“The interests protected by
the knock-and-announce rule include human life and limb (because an unannounced
entry may provoke violence from a surprised resident), property (because citizens
presumably would open the door upon an announcement, whereas a forcible entry may
destroy it), and privacy and dignity”) (emphasis added); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 33–34 (2001) (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of
technology.”) (emphasis added); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997) (“The
Constitution thus contemplates that a State’s government will represent and remain
accountable to its own citizens.”) (emphasis added); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 592 (1992) (“Similarly, [petitioners’s] professional backgrounds in wildlife
preservation . . . also make it likely-at least far more likely than for the average citizenthat they would choose to visit these areas of the world where species are vanishing.”)
(emphasis added); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (“Mendenhall
establishes that the test for existence of a ‘show of authority’ is an objective one: not
whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but
whether the officer’s words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable
person.”) (emphasis added); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S.
365, 368 (1991) (“COA was not alone in urging this course; concerned about the city’s
recent explosion of billboards, a number of citizens including writers of articles and
editorials in local newspapers advocated restrictions.”) (emphasis added); Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987) (“Although a probation officer is not an impartial
magistrate, neither is he the police officer who normally conducts searches against the
ordinary citizen.”) (emphasis added).
70 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008).
71 See D.C. Code § 7-2507.06 (2007) (“A person who . . . possesses a pistol, or
firearm that could otherwise be registered, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned . . . .”).
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of similar flourish occurs when Heller states that “we do not read the
Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any
sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to
protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”72 Again, Justice
Scalia likely did not intend for that one sentence to establish that the First
Amendment protects only the right of persons with United States
citizenship to speak for any purpose.73
Even supposing that Heller intended that the language in its opinion
should be taken literally, there are still practical problems. Assuming for
the sake of argument that Heller actually holds that only those persons
with United States citizenship should be allowed guns, a conflict arises
when this new pronouncement is read against 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), the
federal firearms law that Portillo-Munoz violated. The Code provision
states that it is “unlawful for any person . . . being an alien . . . illegally or
unlawfully in the United States . . . to . . . possess . . . any firearm or
ammunition . . . .”74 If Heller restricts guns to United States citizens, and
Section 922(g)(5) allows guns to any alien who is not in the country
illegally, then the two in conjunction create a twilight zone of gun
legality for the nation’s 12.5 million legal permanent residents (those
immigrants who are lawfully in the United States but do not have
citizenship).75 Far from being hypothetical, this issue has already come
up multiple times in the federal courts, and for the concerned legal
permanent resident, who may or may not be committing a felony by
simply owning a gun, this uncertainty can spell out the difference
between removal from the United States and full citizenship rights.76

72

Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (“But once an alien lawfully
enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution to all people within our borders. Such rights include those protected by the
First and the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
74 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(2012).
75 See Nancy Rytina, Estimates of the Legal Permanent Resident Population in 2009,
Department
of
Homeland
Security
(Nov.
12,
2011),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/lpr_pe_2009.pdf.
76 See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1513 (10th Cir. 1990)
(“Because aliens in the process of applying for legalization of their immigration status
may not be deported, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1160(d) & 1255a(e), they are not unlawfully in the
United States and thereby subject to prosecution under § 922(a)(6)”). See also United
States v. Brissett, 720 F. Supp. 90, 91 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that alien whose
application for legalization was pending at the time he purchased firearm could not be
prosecuted under § 922(g)(5)).
73
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The Text of Heller is Not a Constitutional Test for Noncitizens

The Fifth Circuit is the first federal appellate level court to review
the constitutionality of § 922(g)(5) as it pertains to aliens living
unlawfully in the United States.77 A number of district courts, however,
have already upheld Section 922(g)(5) as constitutional post-Heller. 78
The primary rationale in these cases has been split between two camps:
those courts that have upheld the disallowance of alien gun rights based
on the presumed constitutionality of Section 922(g)(5),79 and those courts
that have upheld the disallowance by holding that undocumented
residents are not members of “the people” as defined by the Second
Amendment. 80 The Fifth Circuit based its holding on the latter
reasoning, which misconstrues precedent and creates a precarious
constitutional position for undocumented residents in that region of the
country.81
The constitutional rights afforded to noncitizens both today and in
the history of the United States can be described as murky at best.82 The
Supreme Court has stated for more than a century that it will grant great
deference to acts of Congress in the immigration sphere 83 in what is
referred to as the “plenary power doctrine.” 84 At the same time, the
Court has not wholly abandoned its role in adjudicating some
fundamental constitutional issues involving noncitizens in the United
77

Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 439.
See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Higuera, No. 1:11-CR-182-TCB-CCH, 2011 WL
3329286 (N.D. Ga. July 6, 2011) (listing eight cases upholding § 922(g)(5) prior to July
2011).
79 See, e.g., United States v. Flores, No. 10-178 JNE JSM, 2010 WL 4720223 (D.
Minn. Nov. 15, 2010) (“Even if illegal aliens fall within the ambit of the Second
Amendment, § 922(g)(5)(A) is constitutional as a ‘presumptively lawful regulatory
measure’ prohibiting the possession of firearms.”).
80 See, e.g., United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, No. 09-40056-01-SAC, 2010 WL
411112 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2010) (“First, the defendant has not shown that as an illegal
alien he has any Second Amendment rights, before or after Heller. Plaintiff has not
shown that illegal aliens are among ‘the people’ contemplated by the Second
Amendment.”)
81 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442 (5th Cir. 2011).
82 See Won Kidane, The Alienage Spectrum Disorder: The Bill of Rights from
Chinese Exclusion to Guantanamo, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 89, 90 (2010) (“. . . a
closer examination of the century-old jurisprudence suggests that the spectrum itself is
replete with inconsistencies and is utterly disordered.”).
83 See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) (“Such matters are
so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune
from judicial inquiry or interference.”); see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (“When once it is established that congress possesses the power to
pass an act, our province ends with its construction and its application to cases as they are
presented for determination.”).
84 See, e.g., Meredith K. Olafson, The Concept of Limited Sovereignty and the
Immigration Law Plenary Power Doctrine, 13 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 433 (1999).
78
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States. 85 Since 1886, the Supreme Court has recognized both that
noncitizens have due process rights under the Fourteen Amendment and
that the judiciary has authority to rule on those claims.86 In recent years,
the Supreme Court has continued to expand the applicability of due
process claims. For example, in Plyler v. Doe,87 the Court overturned a
Texas law that barred undocumented children from attending public
schools. Again ruling on the paramount importance of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court stated “[w]hatever his status under the
immigration laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of
that term.”88 The majority vindicated the principle that, in addition to the
traditional due process guarantees to all persons in the United States, the
Equal Protection Clause also provides constitutional safeguards to a
person regardless of their immigration status. 89 The Court pressed
forward, stating:
In concluding that “all persons within the territory of the United
States,” including aliens unlawfully present, may invoke the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments to challenge actions of the Federal Government, we
reasoned from the understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to afford its protection to all within the boundaries of a State.90
The Plyler decision represents the Court’s reaffirmation of the
inviolability of certain rights – namely, the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments – that apply without regard to the status of the person
seeking the protection. As the Due Process Clause also incorporates
those provisions of the Bill of Rights to the individual states, 91 the

85 See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983) (“The plenary authority of
Congress over aliens . . . is not open to question, but what is challenged here is whether
Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power.”).
86 See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (“But this court has never held, nor
must we now be understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing the
provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental
principles that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution.”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“The Fourteenth
Amendment to the constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens . . . . These
provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality . . .”).
87 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 207 (1982).
88 Id. at 210.
89 Id. at 212 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“The
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens . .
. and the protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.”).
90 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 212 (citing Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369).
91 See, e.g., Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253
(1982) (“Justice Brennan advocated adoption of what is now commonly described as the
‘selective incorporation’ theory of the Fourteenth Amendment. That theory, simply put,
holds that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause fully incorporates all of those
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Fourteenth Amendment serves as a vehicle to afford noncitizens other
constitutional protections.92 For example, more than a half-century ago,
the Supreme Court held that noncitizens have free speech rights under
the First Amendment. 93 The Fourth Amendment has also historically
protected noncitizens. In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court
considered whether the exclusionary rule was required to correct Fourth
Amendment violations in deportation proceedings. 94 While the Court
ultimately held that the Fourth Amendment violation remedy was
unnecessary because it was not a criminal trial, it decided the case
explicitly under the impression that aliens possess Fourth Amendment
rights.95 The Court specifically stated that “[i]mportant as it is to protect
the Fourth Amendment rights of all persons, there is no convincing
indication that application of the exclusionary rule in civil deportation
proceedings will contribute materially to that end.”96
Far from being a groundbreaking holding, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza
merely reaffirmed the strong principle of jurisprudence that, even though
the remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation may be up for debate, the
right itself is not. Other courts have affirmed the notion that the Fourth
Amendment applies to the government and is not concerned with the
status of the person seeking its protection.97 The Second Circuit held that
guarantees of the Bill of Rights deemed to be fundamental and thereby makes those
guarantees applicable to the states.”).
92 See, e.g., Bridges v. State of Cal., 314 U.S. 252, 280 (1941) (“Which one of the
various limitations upon state power introduced by the Fourteenth Amendment absorbs
the First . . . only the Due Process Clause assures constitutional protection of civil
liberties to aliens and corporations.”) See also Choudhry v. Jenkins, 559 F.2d 1085, 1087
(7th Cir. 1977) (“A lawfully admitted resident alien, of course, is a person within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . Therefore, he enjoys the protection of those
amendments in the Bill of Rights which are incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment so as to be applicable to the states, at least in matters wholly unrelated to
immigration and naturalization.”).
93 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (“Freedom of speech and of press is
accorded aliens residing in this country.”).
94 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1046 (1984).
95 See id..
96 Id. (emphasis added).
97 See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (“In the
absence of probable cause or consent, that search violated the petitioner’s [a Mexican
citizen with a valid United States work permit] Fourth Amendment right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217, 247 (1960) (“This is a protection given not only to citizens
but to aliens as well, as the opinion of the Court by implication holds. The right ‘of the
people’ covered by the Fourth Amendment certainly gives security to aliens in the same
degree that ‘person’ in the Fifth and ‘the accused’ in the Sixth Amendments also protects
them.”); see Au Yi Lau v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 223
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (“[s]ince aliens in this country are sheltered by the Fourth Amendment
in common with citizens, such a reading of the Congressional mandate must be controlled
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the right attaches even when the person is in the country illegally: “An
alien within the United States has standing to assert a violation of
constitutional rights even if his presence is illegal . . . . The Government
here does not suggest that appellee is not entitled to the same Fourth
Amendment protection as are citizens.”98
In 1990, however, the Supreme Court’s decision in VerdugoUrquidez demanded a reexamination of its past holdings regarding
noncitizens and the Fourth Amendment. This holding represented both a
step forward and a step back for undocumented residents seeking
constitutional parity with United States citizens. On one hand, it clearly
established a definition of “the people” for the purposes of the First,
Second, and Fourth Amendments. 99 The Court stated that, without
mentioning any citizenship requirement, “the people” “refers to a class of
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part
of that community.”100 The Court further held that Verdugo-Urquidez
was not a member of “the people” because, as an alien who had not come
to the United States willingly, he had “no previous significant voluntary
connection with the United States . . . .”101 Based on that reasoning, the
Fourth Amendment did not apply to him.
The Court, however, refused to acknowledge the inescapable
conclusion that, under its new holding, an undocumented resident could
establish a Fourth Amendment right provided that he or she meet could
establish a sufficient connection with the community. Additionally, the
Court tried to undo the scope of several decades of precedent by
reopening the question of previously settled law regarding the
universality of the Fourth Amendment. The plurality opinion stated that
the Lopez-Mendoza case decided five years earlier,102 which presumed
that undocumented residents could have violable Fourth Amendment
rights, did not in fact decide whether the Fourth Amendment could apply
to undocumented residents. The Court stated that even though “a
majority of Justices assumed that the Fourth Amendment applied to
illegal aliens in the United States . . . [o]ur decision did not expressly
by the constitutional standards governing similar detentions made by other law
enforcement officials.”; see Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 81 (BIA 1979)
(“Thus, even though the suppression of evidence may be the most cumbersome and
unproven tool of deterrence, it is the approach most likely to be pursued by an alien
whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated because of its ‘windfall’ effect.”).
98 United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294, 296 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1975).
99 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
100 Id. at 265.
101 Id. at 271.
102 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
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address the proposition gleaned by the court below.”103 This clever bit of
revisionist jurisprudence allowed the Court to reinvent the wheel and
produce the substantial connections test, which would subsequently
govern decisions determining who is protected by the Fourth
Amendment.
The previous section of this Comment supports the proposition that
many constitutional provisions have traditionally covered noncitizens.
The Due Process Clause, which applies in full force even to those in the
country illegally,104 incorporated the majority of the Bill of Rights to the
States, and most recently the Second Amendment. 105 Because of this
concern over the fundamentality of due process rights, the Supreme
Court has afforded noncitizens other rights like those granted by the First
and Fourth Amendments. 106 It is worth noting here that the First
Amendment, like the Fourth Amendment, contains identical wording to
that of the Second Amendment in describing the “people” to whom it
applies. The Supreme Court itself recognized the congruence of these
amendments when it grouped them together in the Verdugo-Urquidez
decision, referring to the “‘the people’ protected by the Fourth
Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom
rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments”
without distinction.107 Absent any other textual distinction, “the people”
in one amendment surely means “the people,” as both common sense and
the Supreme Court recognize the term, as “refer[ring] to a class of
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise

103 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272 (“The question presented for decision in
Lopez-Mendoza was limited to whether the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule
should be extended to civil deportation proceedings; it did not encompass whether the
protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to illegal aliens in this country.”).
104 See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“There are literally millions of
aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. . . . Even one whose presence in this
country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional
protection.”) (emphasis added).
105 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (“Unless
considerations of stare decisis counsel otherwise, a provision of the Bill of Rights that
protects a right that is fundamental from an American perspective applies equally to the
Federal Government and the States . . . We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in
Heller.”).
106 See, e.g., INS v. Lopez–Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); Bridges v. Wixon, 326
U.S. 135, 148 (1945).
107 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
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developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part
of that community.”108
Therefore, if the Portillo-Muniz court correctly interpreted Heller as
removing noncitizens from the category of “people” in the Bill of Rights,
then the logical implication of this revelation is that the Court took away
not only the Second Amendment from noncitizens, but also the
longstanding protections of the First and Fourth Amendments. The
Supreme Court could not have intended to generate such wide-reaching
implications for so many constitutional rights. The question, then, is how
do the courts determine who has Second Amendment rights.
C. Five Tests for Determining Who Should Obtain Second
Amendment Rights
Today, Section 922(g)(5) forecloses the Second Amendment’s right
to bear arms from undocumented immigrants. 109 Some courts
considering the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(5) upheld the federal
law as a presumptively valid exercise of congressional power.110 Some,
like the Portillo-Munoz court, went so far as to say that those
undocumented residents are not “people” at all for the purposes of the
Bill of Rights, and have ruled on that basis.111 Neither route, however, is
ideal. The first rationale seems less than reasonable when one considers
that the original intent of the firearm ban was to keep guns out of the
hands of people who are dangerous to society.112 The second line of
thinking, involving a perversion of the word “people,” is equally
unsatisfactory because of its incongruence with Supreme Court
precedent.
A survey of the law indicates that there are at least four other
potential tests for determining who should be afforded Second
Amendment and other constitutional rights. These are: (1) the “sufficient
connections” test developed by the Verdugo-Urquidez plurality; (2) the
108

Id.
See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(5).
110 See United States v. Solis-Gonzalez, No. 3:08-CR-145-MR-DCK-1, 2008 WL
4539663, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2008) (“Although the Court need not look beyond
Heller in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, it is important to note that the Fourth
Circuit has addressed the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) on several occasions and
squarely rejected each challenge.”); see also United States v. Wells (rejecting Commerce
Clause argument); see also United States v. Bostic (rejecting Tenth Amendment
argument); see also United States v. Mitchell (rejecting Fifth Amendment Due Process
claim) (citations omitted).
111 See United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, No. 09-40056-01-SAC, 2010 WL 411112, at
*2 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2010) (“Plaintiff has not shown that illegal aliens are among ‘the
people’ contemplated by the Second Amendment.”).
112 See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977).
109
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“governed” test of the Verdugo-Urquidez dissent; (3) the test of the
“active versus passive right” espoused by the Portillo-Munoz court; and
(4) the “intermediate scrutiny” test. Two propositions are not discussed
here: that undocumented residents should not receive any constitutional
protections; or alternatively, that the Second Amendment is not
applicable to anyone outside of a militia context. Despite the strength of
the argument for at least one of these propositions,113 neither are viable
constitutional positions today in light of both longstanding and more
recent cases. 114 Of the four potential approaches, the Tenth Circuit’s
intermediate-scrutiny analysis is preferable, as it allows courts to best
examine the complex nature of the issue.
1. Sufficient Connections Test – Verdugo-Urquidez Plurality
In deciding that a Mexican citizen did not have Fourth Amendment
protection in his home outside the United States, the Verdugo-Urquidez
plurality held that “the people” under the Fourth Amendment are
members of “a class of persons who are part of a national community or
who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to
be considered part of that community.”115 The Court also suggested that
this test would apply with equal force to other similarly worded
amendments, including the Second Amendment.116
One might commend this decision as an arguably sensible
compromise to constitutional rights for aliens – namely, that an
undocumented resident, despite his lack of official entry, may be

113 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (“In the absence of any
evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than
eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not
within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or
that its use could contribute to the common defense.”); See also David Yassky, The
Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV.
588, 589 (2000) (“The question at the heart of this debate is whether the Amendment
restricts the government’s ability to regulate the private possession of firearms. Since at
least 1939 – when the Supreme Court decided United States v. Miller, its only decision
squarely addressing the scope of the right to “keep and bear Arms” – the answer to that
question has been an unqualified ‘no.’ Courts have brushed aside Second Amendment
challenges to gun control legislation, reading the Amendment to forbid only laws that
interfere with states’ militias.”).
114 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); see also Dist. of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
115 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
116 Id. (“While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive suggests that “the
people” protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments,
and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments . . .”).
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properly viewed as a member of the community. This standard reflects
the reasonable view that not all undocumented immigrants are created
equal, and that an undocumented resident of the United States who holds
a job and pays Social Security taxes should not be categorically grouped
with a drug runner who involuntarily entered the country.117 The former
provides some benefit to the community;118 the latter certainly does not.
This view reflects a realistic notion of the complexity of immigration
issues today. 119 It is also in line with the congressional approach to
removing aliens, which includes provisions to cancel an alien’s
deportation based on certain community ties. 120 This approach would
presumably create an incentive, similar to the one provided for by the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
for undocumented residents to maintain community presence and obey
the nation’s laws in the hope that these actions could someday be
counted in their favor. Because of its resemblance to the current law (as
well as others recently proposed),121 the sufficient connections test meets
the expectations of those undocumented residents who are more familiar
with the well-defined rules of immigration law than the vagaries of the
Supreme Court’s holdings.
The sufficient connections test, however, is not without its critics.
The dissenters, led by Justice Brennan in Verdugo-Urquidez, assailed the
117 Won Kidane, The Alienage Spectrum Disorder: The Bill of Rights from Chinese
Exclusion to Guantanamo, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 89, 125 (2010) (“All three
branches of government do their own share of crafting immigration laws and policies.
Together, about a century ago, they created this notion that some immigrants are more
alien than others and repeated the same theme consistently throughout the last century.”).
118 See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, Illegal Immigrants Are Bolstering Social Security With
Billions,
N.Y.
TIMES.
Apr.
5,
2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/05/business/05immigration.html?ex=1270353600&en=
78c87ac4641dc383&ei=5090.
119 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n. 17 (1982) (quoting Joint Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House
Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1981) (testimony of
William French Smith, Attorney General)(“We have neither the resources, the capability,
nor the motivation to uproot and deport millions of illegal aliens, many of whom have
become, in effect, members of the community.”).
120 See 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b)(1) (stating that the Attorney General may cancel removal
of a deportable alien if the alien has been present in the United States for the last ten
years, has been a person of good moral character, and establishes that removal would
“result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or
child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence.”).
121 See Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act, S. 729, 111th Cong.
(2009) (proposing conditional permanent residency to certain illegal aliens who arrived in
the country as minors, have graduated from high school, and maintain a good moral
character).
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uncertainty in the rule, stating that “[t]he Court admits that ‘the people’
extends beyond the citizenry, but leaves the precise contours of its
‘sufficient connection’ test unclear.” 122 Indeed, only the most selfassured undocumented resident would feel safe under that test; all others
would be left with the nagging suspicion that their connections to the
community might be deemed insufficient. This uncertainty, of course,
will not be confined only to those undocumented residents; law
enforcement officers, for example, will also feel the pinch from this test.
To government agents, this additional wrinkle in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence will only add to the unease produced by not knowing what
course of action they can pursue when confronted with a suspect of
ambiguous citizenship.123
Other critics have argued that the sufficient connections test
“created an expansive gray area[,]” which has led to inconsistent lower
court rulings.124 A brief look at a few examples of post-Verdugo cases
demonstrates that the sufficient connections test has shown itself to be of
little predictive value for determining who will obtain the protections of
the Fourth Amendment. In one case, the District Court of Vermont ruled
on the availability of the exclusionary rule for a Canadian citizen arrested
in a United States airport with a fraudulently-procured visa. 125 The
district court, granting the motion to suppress evidence from the illegal
search, stated that the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the
noncitizen because “the defendants’ presence in the United States was
voluntary, and they had gained admission, albeit surreptitiously, for a
temporary visit as tourists. Such connections . . . constitute the type of
connections which would vest in aliens the protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment . . . .”126 In contrast, a Texas appellate court upheld
the conviction of a Colombian national who had been unlawfully present
in the United States for two years. 127 Although the court’s Verdugo122

Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–86 (1975) (“In this
case the officers relied on a single factor to justify stopping respondent’s car: the apparent
Mexican ancestry of the occupants. We cannot conclude that this furnished reasonable
grounds to believe that the three occupants were aliens.”).
124 Douglas I. Koff, Post-Verdugo-Urquidez: The Sufficient Connection Test –
Substantially Ambiguous, Substantially Unworkable, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 435,
471 (1994) (“Although it is easy to determine when an alien’s connection has not reached
the level of Verdugo-Urquidez’s, it is difficult to determine whether the alien who has
developed more of a connection with the United States than Verdugo-Urquidez is
afforded Fourth Amendment protection.”).
125 United States v. Tehrani, 826 F. Supp. 789 (D. Vt. 1993) aff’d, 49 F.3d 54 (2d Cir.
1995).
126 Id. at 793 n. 1.
127 Torres v. State, 818 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. App. 1991) review granted in part,
decision vacated, 825 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
123
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Urquidez analysis was ultimately not dispositive, it still stated that the
defendant would not have standing to challenge the search because he
“had not been employed during his two years in the United States and
was living off money given him by his brothers, who were convicted
drug traffickers or charged with drug trafficking and on fugitive
status.”128
The Fifth Circuit has itself produced an important precedential case
– one cited in the Portillo-Munoz dissent, which suggests that PortilloMunoz is one of “the people.”129 In Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, the
court held that a Mexican citizen who crossed the border into the United
States once a month had a Fourth Amendment right to pursue a remedy
when she attempted to cross with a recently invalidated visa. 130 The
court agreed that “her regular and lawful entry of the United States
pursuant to a valid border-crossing card and her acquiescence in the U.S.
system of immigration constitute[d] her voluntary acceptance of societal
obligations, rising to the level of ‘substantial connections.’”131
One might criticize the Verdugo-Urquidez test for injecting more
confusion into the area of constitutional rights. From the above cases, it
should be clear that there is little predictive value in the test. A foreign
national who comes across the border for a few days under false
pretenses is a member of “the people,”132 while a two-year resident is
not.133 A Mexican citizen who has never had any intention of developing
any sort of substantial relationship with the United States becomes one of
“the people” because her monthly acquiescence to Border Patrol could
constitute her voluntary acceptance of societal obligations. The
Verdugo-Urquidez court’s conflation of several distinct and potentially
conflicting factors – the sufficient connections, the national community,
and the voluntary presence – may have made this test too complex for
lower courts to apply consistently.

128 Id. at 146 n. 1 (“Appellant demonstrated no meaningful ties to the community and
we do not find he is entitled to the protection accorded ‘We the people of the United
States’ as originally intended by the framers of either the federal or state constitutions.”).
129 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 445 (2011) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
130 Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 625 (5th Cir. 2006).
131 Id. (“There may be cases in which an alien’s connection with the United States is
so tenuous that he cannot reasonably expect the protection of its constitutional
guarantees; the nature and duration of Martinez-Aguero’s contacts with the United States,
however, are sufficient to confer Fourth Amendment rights.”).
132 United States v. Tehrani, 826 F. Supp. 789, 798 (D. Vt. 1993) aff’d, 49 F.3d 54 (2d
Cir. 1995).
133 Torres v. State, 818 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. App. 1991).
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2. “We the Governed” – The Verdugo-Urquidez Dissent
Justices Brennan and Marshall, the dissenters in Verdugo-Urquidez,
proposed a broader and simpler test for determining who are “people” for
the purposes of the Bill of Rights. They stated that Verdugo-Urquidez
should be considered included in the protections because “our
Government, by investigating him and attempting to hold him
accountable under United States criminal laws, has treated him as a
member of our community for purposes of enforcing our laws.”134 The
dissent argued that whenever agents of the United States government
seek to enforce U.S. criminal laws upon those outside the citizenry or the
territoriality, they “in turn are obliged to respect certain correlative
rights, among them the Fourth Amendment.”135 The dissent thus opted
for a much simpler rule that, if nothing else, prevents a headache to any
undocumented resident, law enforcement officer, judge or even frustrated
law student trying impatiently to determine who is sufficiently connected
to the United States. Whenever the authority of the United States tries to
govern him, the defendant “become[s], quite literally, one of the
governed.”136
Besides the clear advantages of simplicity and predictive value,
there are other reasons to approve of “the governed” test of the dissent.
Fundamentally, the rule appeals to a sense of “mutuality and
fundamental fairness that are central to our Nation’s constitutional
conscience[,]” that one might argue is often absent when it comes to
considering the rights of noncitizens. 137 Perhaps it is the echo of the
Golden Rule that rings true in the dissent’s statement that “[i]f we expect
aliens to obey our laws, aliens should be able to expect that we will obey
our Constitution when we investigate, prosecute, and punish them.”138
When viewed against such a statement of basic equity, any argument for
denying rights to less-connected aliens seems unreasonable.
The dissent also bolsters its argument with an appeal to history,
arguing that the majority missed the forest for the trees by suggesting
that a right so fundamental to the founding of the country should be read
narrowly. 139 Refusing to make a decision based solely on the social
134

Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 284.
Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 286.
138 Id. at 284.
139 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 at 287–88 (“Whereas the British Parliament was
unconstrained, the Framers intended to create a Government of limited powers.
Bestowing rights and delineating protected groups would have been inconsistent with the
Drafters’s fundamental conception of a Bill of Rights as a limitation on the Government’s
conduct with respect to all whom it seeks to govern.”).
135
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compact theory of the Constitution, Justice Brennan’s dissent (and
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence)140 instead stated that “the Framers of the
Bill of Rights did not purport to ‘create’ rights” but “[r]ather, they
designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government from infringing
rights and liberties presumed to be pre-existing.” 141 Ironically, this
originalist focus, rejected by Justice Scalia in Verdugo-Urquidez when
applied to the Fourth Amendment, would twenty years later become his
main selling point for striking down gun control laws when he stated that
“it has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like
the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right” and
“[t]he very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the preexistence of the right and declares only that it shall not be infringed.”142
The major critique of the dissent’s “governed” rule is the refrain
commonly delivered in response to such idealistic arguments – it is
“impracticable.” 143 Justice Kennedy, for example, believed that the
difficulties such as “[t]he absence of local judges or magistrates available
to issue warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions
of reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to
cooperate with foreign officials” would make the Fourth Amendment
potentially much harder to comply with abroad. 144 Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the plurality, took an even more pragmatic approach, holding
that “[f]or better or for worse, we live in a world of nation-states in
which our Government must be able to function effectively in the
company of sovereign nations.” 145
He continued, “[s]ituations
threatening to important American interests may arise halfway around
the globe, situations which in the view of the political branches of our
Government require an American response with armed force.”146 This
point of view would take on heightened importance after the attacks of
September 11th, as courts began to question just how much
140 Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“A government may originate in the
voluntary compact or assent of the people of several states . . . . But the difficulty in
asserting it to be a compact between the people of each state, and all the people of the
other states is, that the constitution itself contains no such expression, and no such
designation of parties.” (quoting Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution § 365, p. 335
(1833)).
141 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 at 288.
142 Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553
(1876) (“[t]his is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner
dependent upon that instrument for its existence.”).
143 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
144 Id. at 278.
145 Id. at 275 (citing Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958)).
146 Id. at 274.
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constitutional protection should be afforded when dealing with alleged
terrorists.147 In many cases, some protections of the Constitution were
sacrificed to similar concerns of practicality.148
3. “Affirmative Versus Passive Right” Test – Portillo-Munoz
Majority
The Fifth Circuit, while still holding that the Fourth Amendment
does not apply to undocumented residents,149 did not rest its decision on
the inapplicability of the Verdugo-Urquidez standard alone. The court,
perhaps recognizing that it was treading on uncertain ground in such a
strict reading of the “sufficient connections” test,150 sought to distinguish
its gun holding, of which there was no contradicting precedent, from its
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, which was not supported by
even its own precedent.151 To shore up its interpretation of the Second
Amendment, the majority stated that “. . . we do not find that the use of
‘the people’ in both the Second and the Fourth Amendment mandates a
holding that the two amendments cover exactly the same groups of
people.” 152 The court continued saying that “[t]he purposes of the
Second and the Fourth Amendment are different[,] . . . . [t]he Second
Amendment grants an affirmative right to keep and bear arms, while the
Fourth Amendment is at its core a protective right against abuses by the
government.” 153 Because of this difference in intention, the court
reasoned that it was “reasonable that an affirmative right would be
extended to fewer groups than would a protective right.”154 One may
criticize the Portillo-Munoz court’s decision for its inconsistency.
Essentially, the court states that undocumented residents do not have
147 See generally Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 497–98 (2004) (“Today, the Court
springs a trap on the Executive, subjecting Guantanamo Bay to the oversight of the
federal courts even though it has never before been thought to be within their jurisdictionand thus making it a foolish place to have housed alien wartime detainees.”).
148 See, e.g., Tung Yin, President Obama’s First Two Years: A Legal Reflection:
“Anything but Bush?”: The Obama Administration and Guantanamo Bay, 34 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 453 (2011).
149 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440 (“ . . . neither this court nor the Supreme Court
has held that the Fourth Amendment extends to a native and citizen of another nation
who entered and remained in the United States illegally.”).
150 Note the unsure language: “Moreover, even if there were precedent for the
proposition that illegal aliens generally are covered by the Fourth Amendment . . . “; Id.
at 440.
151 See, e.g., Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that
a Mexican citizen who had inadvertently attempted an unlawful border crossing still had
sufficient connections to be protected by the Fourth Amendment).
152 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440.
153 Id. at 440–41.
154 Id. at 441.
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either Second or Fourth Amendment rights, but that, paradoxically, even
if undocumented residents do have Fourth Amendment rights, they still
do not have Second Amendment rights.
The majority’s affirmative versus passive rights distinction may
sound convincing at first blush for those who suspect deep down there is
some difference between brandishing a gun and keeping the government
out of one’s house. Portillo-Munoz, however, cited no support for this
statement. In fact, this deceptively simple statement comes from the
Government’s brief, which argued that “[t]he Fourth Amendment is a
passive, or defensive right that protects the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures” and that ”[i]n contrast, the Second Amendment
codifies an affirmative right to use arms. The Government concluded
that “[a]ccordingly, one cannot define the scope of the Second
Amendment by analogy to the Fourth [Amendment].” 155 For the first
half of its proposition, the Government cited Verdugo-Urquidez.156 For
the second half, it cited Heller’s focus on “law-abiding, responsible
citizens[.]” 157 When one searches for a reference to the “affirmative
right” of the Second Amendment, however, one finds that it does not
appear until much later, deep into the dissent of Heller. Justice Stevens,
dissenting vigorously from the Court’s new vindication of the Second
Amendment as a personal right, 158 stated, “[b]y way of contrast, the
Fourth Amendment describes a right against governmental interference
rather than an affirmative right to engage in protected conduct, and so
refers to a right to protect a purely individual interest.”159 This dissenting
opinion is the source of the textual support that the Government argues,
and the Portillo-Munoz majority subsequently ratifies into Fifth Circuit
law. While a lower court acts questionably when it decides a case based
on the dissenting opinion of a Supreme Court ruling, the situation is even
more suspect when that dissenting opinion runs contrary to the majority
opinion that the lower court is purporting to affirm.160 The Fifth Circuit

155 Brief for Respondent at 9–10, United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 439
(5th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-10086).
156 Id. at 10 (“. . . [t]he purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of
the United States against arbitrary action by their own Government.”).
157 Id. at 10 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 635).
158 See Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 678, 666, 649, 639. 652 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(referring to the majority’s analysis as being “simply wrong,” “without any real analysis,”
“fundamentally fail[ing] to grasp the point,” and “feeble.”). Perhaps most damning,
Justice Stevens also states “not a word in the constitutional text even arguably supports
the Court’s overwrought and novel description of the Second Amendment . . . .”).
159 Id. at 646 (emphasis added).
160 See also Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265 (“it suggests that ‘the people’
protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to
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used the Heller majority opinion 161 for the ruling, and the antithetical
dissent for the rationale.162
Thus, the primary disadvantage to the “affirmative versus passive
right” test is that it lacks any sort of precedential support, even in its own
circuit. 163 On this basis alone, it seems unlikely that any other court
would use such a rule. If the Supreme Court has repeatedly established
that the concurrently-passed amendments in the Bill of Rights refer to the
same people,164 then absent any newly-discovered historical evidence, it
would seem arbitrary to pick and choose those that will apply only to
citizens. This outcome seems inimical to the idea of the Constitution
creating “a government of laws, and not of men.”165 The “affirmative
versus passive right” test also opens up the door to the possibility that
courts could strip away more rights from noncitizens simply by
designating them as “affirmative,” and not “passive.” For example, due
process, though guaranteed to noncitizens since 1886,166 might still be
someday deemed “affirmative” under this test if certain provisions of due
process require some active participation of the defendant.
D. The Intermediate-Scrutiny Test
One of the major questions that the Heller majority left unanswered
is what standard of review should be applied when reviewing gun
legislation. 167 When deciding whether a law impermissibly burdens a
whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a
class of persons . . .”); See also Heller, 554 U.S. at 579.
161 Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and
history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear
arms.”).
162 Id. at 645 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[i]t is the collective action of individuals
having a duty to serve in the militia that the text directly protects and, perhaps more
importantly, that the ultimate purpose of the Amendment was to protect the States’s share
of the divided sovereignty created by the Constitution”).
163 See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 227–28 (5th Cir. 2001) (“There is no
evidence in the text of the Second Amendment, or any other part of the Constitution, that
the words ‘the people’ have a different connotation within the Second Amendment than
when employed elsewhere in the Constitution. In fact, the text of the Constitution, as a
whole, strongly suggests that the words ‘the people’ have precisely the same meaning
within the Second Amendment as without.”).
164 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 579; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
165 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
166 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“The Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens.”).
167 See, e.g., Jason T. Anderson, Second Amendment Standards of Review: What the
Supreme Court Left Unanswered in District of Columbia v. Heller, 82 S. CAL. L. REV.
547, 547–48 (2009) (“But the Court left the door open for a new debate to begin in the
Second Amendment context: what standard of review applies to legislation that restricts
an individual’s right to bear arms?”).
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person’s constitutional right, a court will traditionally try to measure the
importance of the government interest at stake against how closely
related the law is to that achieving that interest. 168 Heller pointedly
refused to decide what level of review was being used to strike down the
District of Columbia gun law as unconstitutional, instead stating: “Under
any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated
constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the most preferred firearm
in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family,’
would fail constitutional muster.”169 In a footnote, Justice Scalia added
that rational basis would be especially inappropriate as a standard of
review, as the gun law was within the scope of the Bill of Rights.170 The
dissent criticized the majority for this purposeful omission by asking
“[h]ow is a court to determine whether a particular firearm regulation
(here, the District’s restriction on handguns) is consistent with the
Second Amendment? What kind of constitutional standard should the
court use? How high a protective hurdle does the Amendment erect?
The question matters.” 171 Justice Breyer, in dissent, instead argued for a
balancing-test to weigh the interests of the government against the
constitutionally-protected rights of the people.172 The majority, however,
168 For a more thorough discussion on the standards of review and how they have
been applied to gun laws after Heller, see Sarah Perkins, District of Columbia v. Heller:
The Second Amendment Shoots One Down, 70 LA. L. REV. 1061, 1074 (2010) (“The
Supreme Court traditionally uses three levels of constitutional scrutiny-rationality review,
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny-in evaluating claims that a person’s
constitutional rights have been infringed. Each of these three levels of constitutional
scrutiny contains two prongs in its analysis. The first prong determines the government
interest in a particular regulation at issue, while the second prong examines the
connection between the government interest and the regulation.”).
169 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (citation omitted).
170 Id. at 629 (“But rational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used when
evaluating laws under constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions on
irrational laws . . . . Obviously, the same test could not be used to evaluate the extent to
which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech,
the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear
arms.”) (quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938)
(“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments . . .”).
171 Id. at 687–88 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I would simply adopt such an interestbalancing inquiry explicitly. The fact that important interests lie on both sides of the
constitutional equation suggests that review of gun-control regulation is not a context in
which a court should effectively presume either constitutionality (as in rational-basis
review) or unconstitutionality (as in strict scrutiny). Rather, where a law significantly
implicates competing constitutionally protected interests in complex ways, the Court
generally asks whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent
that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important
governmental interests.) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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firmly rejected such a test as inconsistent with the Court’s past treatment
of constitutional rights.173
As a result, lower courts have been inconsistent in determining
what level of review is now appropriate when ruling on the
constitutionality of Section 922(g) post-Heller. 174 Some courts have
continued to apply rational basis, finding that Heller “specifically stated
the particular regulations were constitutional, as regarding felons and the
mentally ill, Sections 922(g)(1) and (4), or via analogy to the so called
‘presumptively lawful regulations.’”175 Nevertheless, the most common
approach has been to uphold different provisions of the federal gun law
under some form of intermediate scrutiny.176 Situated between rational
basis and strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny is a “flexible standard
[that] generally requires the government to establish that the challenged
law is substantially related to an important governmental interest.” 177
This is the same analysis that the Tenth Circuit applied in HuitronGuizar.178
The primary advantage to using such a test is that it accounts for the
complexity of the issue, and does make its case solely on the obscure and
ambiguous intentions of a generation long past. For the question of
undocumented residents and firearms, for example, this test profits
greatly from the fact that our conceptions have dramatically changed
over the past couple centuries, from when both immigration and gun
173 Id. at 634 (“We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core
protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”).
174 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 443 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (commenting that courts of appeal have taken various approaches to scrutinizing
laws regarding firearms, including a substantial burden test, declining to label the level of
scrutiny being applied, applying a sliding scale test, and intermediate scrutiny).
175 United States v. Chester, 367 F. App’x 392, 396–97, reh’g granted (Dec. 30,
2010), opinion vacated on reh’g, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010) (nevertheless concluding
that intermediate scrutiny was more appropriate because Court dicta could not control
every gun challenge).
176 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 443-44, n. 4 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Although it should be noted that several appellate courts, while still
using intermediate scrutiny, have found creative ways to rework the standard. See, e.g.,
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir.2010) (developing “a two-prong
analysis to determine whether a regulation violates a defendant’s Second Amendment
right to bear arms. A district court must first determine whether the right sought to be
regulated is within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection . . . . If the district
court finds that the right is protected by the Second Amendment, the court . . . should
apply intermediate scrutiny to determine whether there is a reasonable fit between the
challenged regulation and a substantial government objective.”) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks).
177 United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir. 2009) reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated, 08-3770, 2010 WL 1267262 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2010) and on reh’g en
banc, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010).
178 United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d at 1169.
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laws were of a wholly different magnitude.179 The intermediate scrutiny
test would take into account, to give just one example, the difficulty in
firearm registration for a group of people who generally lack valid
documentation. The other standards ignore such a critical practical issue
when deciding Second Amendment rights. A judge might decide to
examine any of the myriad of other governmental interests which might
ultimately be dispositive. For example, the Government, in a brief for
one case, offered this justification for keeping guns out of the hands of
noncitizens: “‘Defense of the State’ or the community, is a duty peculiar
to the citizen . . . . The alien who has not declared an intention to become
a citizen has no obligation to defend the State or the community.” 180
Such a statement is of course no longer true, both in light of Heller’s new
pronouncement of individual (and not militia) gun ownership,181 as well
as the strong encouragement of noncitizens to serve in the United States
Armed Forces.182
Under an intermediate scrutiny analysis, a court could no longer ask
merely “whether the challenged law is a reasonable method of regulating
the right to bear arms.”183 For example, “[i]f a state attempted to disarm
its citizenry completely, such a law might well survive rational basis
review, assuming the goal is public safety and that a rational legislator
could conclude that banning all firearms furthers public safety.”184 If we
analogize this example to the case of noncitizens, we find such a law
exists in the form of Section 922(g)(5), and courts have routinely upheld
it as rational. But because under intermediate scrutiny “[t]he government
bears the burden of justifying its regulation in the context of heightened

179 See, e.g., id. (“We know, for instance, that the founders’s notion of citizenship was
less rigid than ours, largely tied to the franchise, which itself was often based on little
more than a period of residence and being a male with some capital.”).
180 Brief for Respondent at 9-10, State v. Hernandez-Mercado, 879 P.2d 283, No.
60220-4 (Wash. 1994).
181 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text
and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear
arms.”).
182 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1439 (West) (“A person who has served honorably at any time in
the armed forces of the United States for a period or periods aggregating one year . . .
may be naturalized without having resided, continuously immediately preceding the date
of filing such person’s application, in the United States for at least five years . . .”); See
also Who Must Register Chart, Selective Service System (Dec. 4, 2011),
http://www.sss.gov/PDFs/WhoMustRegisterChart.pdf
(showing that the Selective
Service Act requires that virtually all male citizens and aliens, even those who are
undocumented, must register for the United States draft upon their eighteenth birthday.).
183 Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 717
(2007).
184 Id.
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scrutiny review,” 185 courts will now be required to examine the
stereotypes of undocumented residents that led to the passage of such
gun laws and see if they have any basis in reality.186 For some at least,
an objective look at facts and statistics may yield a surprisingly fresh
perspective on immigration in the United States today. To give just one
example, studies have shown that native-born Americans are
significantly more likely to be incarcerated than those born abroad,
including those who migrate here illegally.187 A court, when presented
with such statistics, may find that the public safety justification for the
firearm ban for undocumented residents no longer carries as much force.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are primarily two lines of decisions in recent court holdings
denying undocumented residents gun rights. The first type of decision
presumes that Heller decided that the Second Amendment applies only to
United States citizens, and anyone outside of the group could not be
counted as a member of “the people.”188 The second type presumes that
§ 922(g) is constitutional as a “longstanding prohibition” that is a
“presumptively lawful regulatory measure[] . . . .”189 Some decisions,
like the recent Fifth Circuit case of United States v. Portillo-Munoz,
employ both philosophies. Neither approach is correct.
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Heller, to be sure,
represented a “dramatic upheaval in the law.”190 Heller did, in fact, as
the dissent predicted, “throw into doubt the constitutionality of gun laws
throughout the United States.”191 What it did not do, however, was strip
away the rights of noncitizens for the purposes of the Second
Amendment (as well as the identically-worded First and Fourth
185

United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010).
See, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram, ‘The People’ of the Second Amendment:
Citizenship and the Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1527 (2010)
(“showcas[ing] the ways in which citizenship restrictions in the firearms context have
operated as a proxy for racial discrimination, helped construct sinister versions of the
foreign ‘other’ unfit to wield arms, and contributed to the indeterminacy of citizenship’s
content.”).
187 See, e.g., Brief for Defendant at *1 n. 1, United States v. Solis-Gonzalez, 2008 WL
4539663 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2008) (referencing Ruben G. Rumbaut & Walter A. Ewing,
The Myth of Immigrant Criminality and the Paradox of Assimilation: Incarceration Rates
among Native and Foreign-Born Men (Immigration Policy Center, Spring 2007)( “In
contrast to felons and those previously found to be seriously mentally ill, persons
“illegally or unlawfully in the United States” are no more likely than persons legally in
the United States to commit violent crimes.”).
188 See, e.g., Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442.
189 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
190 Id. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 722 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
186
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Amendments).192 Though critics have suggested that this may represent
Justice Scalia’s ulterior motive in the Heller decision,193 courts should
not fashion such a broad holding out of a few words of dicta. Despite the
Portillo-Munoz court’s erroneous interpretation, the Supreme Court has
not overruled the Verdugo-Urquidez “sufficient connections” holding.
The Verdugo-Urquidez standard therefore remains the primary test of
who will be counted among “the people” of the Constitution.
Nevertheless, any constitutional right, fundamental or otherwise,
may still have reasonable restrictions imposed upon it. 194 The Heller
decision commands that, for better or worse, gun control laws must now
pass some higher level of scrutiny than was previously applied.195 Courts
should continue to uphold some restrictions in U.S.C. §922(g), such as
those that prevent former felons from owning firearms as being
substantially related to an important government purpose. Indeed, courts
should tighten restrictions when they are found not to be doing enough to
support public safety.196 For other restrictions, such as those that prevent
undocumented residents from owning firearms solely because of their

192 Id. at 580, incorrectly citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265 (“What is more, in
all six other provisions of the Constitution that mention ‘the people,’ the term
unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified
subset. As we said in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez . . . ‘[T]he people’ seems to
have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution .... [that] refers to a
class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed
sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.”)
(emphasis added).
193 See Gulasekaram, supra fn. 188 at 1536 (“Second, Scalia’s formulation of “the
people” in Heller contradicts, while purporting to affirm, Verdugo-Urquidez’s definition.
Citing Verdugo-Urquidez, the Heller majority suggests that it adopts that opinion’s
understanding that ‘the people’ meant ‘all members of the political community.’ This
misquotation of the prior opinion appears to be a sleight of hand intended to constrict the
constitutional definition of ‘the people.’ Reformulating membership with a ‘political’
rather than a ‘national’ lens is significant because the former implies only those with
political rights – e.g., voting, public office – while the latter is malleable, potentially
including all who believe in the ideals of, and are connected to, the nation.”); see also
Charles Sullivan, Professor, Seton Hall Law, Hidden Legacies of the Supreme Court’s
2010-2011 Employment Decisions (Oct. 24, 2011) (“For every big juicy worm Scalia
gives you, he always hides a hook in his opinions.”).
194 See, e.g., United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“[G]overnment may impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech . . . .”).
195 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29.
196 See, e.g., Michael Luo, Felons Finding It Easy to Regain Gun Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/us/felons-finding-it-easy-to-regaingun-rights.html?_r=1&ref=us (“Yet every year, thousands of felons across the country
have those rights reinstated, often with little or no review. In several states, they include
people convicted of violent crimes, including first-degree murder and manslaughter, an
examination by The New York Times has found.”).
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status, courts may have a more difficult time establishing the relationship
between the group and the “fundamental” right at stake .197
The Supreme Court once noted that “[t]he legislative history [of the
firearms act] . . . supports the view that Congress sought to rule broadly
to keep guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated that ‘they
may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to
society.’” 198 Twenty-five years later, when we read stories in the
newspaper about new state laws that are “intended to drive illegal
immigrants from the state by making every aspect of their life
difficult,”199 we begin to appreciate that maybe the question we should be
asking is not “Are undocumented residents a threat to our society,” but
instead, “Is our society becoming a threat to them?”200

197

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3042 (2010).
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977).
199 Campbell Robertson, Critics See ‘Chilling Effect’ in Alabama Immigration Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/us/alabamaimmigration-laws-critics-question-target.html?_r=1&src=recg.
(“The champions of
Alabama’s far-reaching immigration law have said that it is intended to drive illegal
immigrants from the state by making every aspect of their life difficult.”).
200 See, e.g., The Twilight Zone: The Monsters Are Due on Maple Street (CBS
television broadcast Mar. 4, 1960) (“There are weapons that are simply thoughts,
attitudes, prejudices, to be found only in the minds of men. For the record, prejudices can
kill and suspicion can destroy . . . .”).
198

